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In 2009, a Gallup survey found that about 16 per cent of the world’s adult population would like to permanently
migrate to another country. International migration of such magnitude may have far-reaching consequences for
sending and destination countries. For instance, between destination countries it may induce competition for talent,
i.e. high-skill migrants, in order to cope with ageing populations and shrinking workforces. Countries of origin, by
contrast, may fear that the emigration may lead to, e.g., labour force shortages and a loss of critical knowledge, with
a ‘brain drain’ consequently threatening economic development.
Why do individuals migrate? Previous studies identify various push factors (i.e., conditions in the migrants’ home
countries that encourage migration) such as poor economic performance, corruption and terrorism that make
individuals leave their home countries. We argue that in addition to these factors, economic freedom also matters.
Indeed, as shown in Table 1, for the 1980-2010 period, economic freedom (measured by an index accounting for the
size of the government, inflation, property rights protection, market regulation and access to international markets)
has always been markedly lower in the 91 sending (developing and emerging) countries we consider in our
empirical analysis compared to the 20 most attractive OECD destination countries. Potentially, a lack of economic
freedom at home explains out-migration to countries where economic freedom is higher. Conversely, when
economic freedom is already high at home, there may be fewer incentives to migrate to another country.
Table 1: Economic Freedom in Sending and Target Countries of Migration, 1976-2010
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We argue that higher levels of economic freedom in the migrants’ home country may reduce incentives to migrate
via three channels: First, more economic freedom creates more economic security in form of better protected
property rights and lower levels of taxation, which increases income and secures wealth in the migrants’ home
country. Second, more economic freedom creates additional economic opportunities by providing greater access to
markets and limiting regulation, which facilitates entrepreneurship at home. Third, more economic freedom
stimulates economic growth. Through all three channels, higher levels of economic freedom can be expected to
discourage out-migration by making the home country more attractive, thus increasing the opportunity costs of
migration.
Our empirical analysis uses data on migration from 91 developing and emerging countries to the 20 most attractive
OECD destination countries for the 1980-2010 period, and provides evidence that cross-country differences in
economic freedom indeed explain why some countries see more out-migration than others. We find that higher
levels of economic freedom in the migrants’ home countries are associated with less migration to OECD countries.
Furthermore, we analyse whether the incentives created by economic freedom matter differently to low-skill
migrants (with only basic education) compared to high-skill ones (with post-secondary education). In line with
previous studies, we indeed show that the effect of economic freedom on migration differs with the migrants’
education profile. We find that the highly educated are responsive to the incentives created by economic freedom,
especially in the form of more economic security (i.e., better property rights protection as well as lower levels of
taxation, inflation and government redistribution).
Consequently, a lack of institutions securing economic freedom encourages the highly skilled to leave their home
country. Our findings are also economically substantial: With an 18 per cent increase of economic freedom (which is
equivalent to the development of Singapore from 1980-2010 or the average difference between Estonia and El
Salvador), the share of high-skill persons leaving the country decreases by 14 per cent on average. By contrast,
low-skilled migration is not associated with the level of economic freedom in sending countries in statistically
significant or economically substantive ways.
Our findings have important implications for policy-makers in both the target and sending countries of migration.
First, our results implicitly suggest that in order to remain attractive for high-skill labour, the receiving OECD
countries ought to continue to offer high levels of economic freedom, most importantly associated with the protection
of property, income and wealth. This might be also of interest for European destination countries since they are
currently less successful than North America in attracting high-skill migrants (see here), where most of them also
have lower levels of economic freedom (see here). Second, sending countries that fear losing their most educated
citizens and want to discourage their out-migration are well-advised to remove institutional barriers that limit
economic freedom, particularly with respect to the provision of economic security.
For instance, related policies may include reforms to strengthen judicial integrity to better protect property rights,
2/3
sound monetary policies that promote price stability as well as reduced intrusion of the government into the
economic life. Such efforts ought to be especially appropriate for sending countries when the costs of high-skill
migration (e.g., due to skill and labour shortages or “wasted” public investments from training of high-skill migrants)
outweigh its potential benefits (from, e.g., remittances and knowledge spill-overs).
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Notes:
This article is based on the authors’ paper Stymied ambition: Does a lack of economic freedom lead to
migration? (No. 2016-05). Discussion Paper Series, Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur für Ordnungs-und
Wettbewerbspolitik. It was presented at the 31st annual meeting of the European Economic Association , in
Geneva, Switzerland, August 2016.
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